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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that public statues of persons typically express a positive 
evaluative attitude towards the subject. It also argues that states have duties to re-
pudiate their own historical wrongdoing, and to condemn other people’s serious 
wrongdoing. Both duties are incompatible with retaining public statues of people 
who perpetrated serious rights violations. Hence, a person’s being a serious rights 
violator is a suffi  cient condition for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue 
of that person. I argue that this applies no less in the case of the ‘morally ambiguous’ 
wrongdoer, who both accomplishes signifi cant goods and perpetrates serious rights 
violations. The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can 
be defeated by lesser-evil considerations. If removing a statue would, for example, 
spark a violent riot that would risk unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove 
could be outweighed by the duty not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would 
provide a lesser-evil justifi cation for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty 
to remove is outweighed, rather than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when 
a duty is negated, one still owes something in cases of outweighing. And it especially 
matters that it is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour 
by others.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper argues that if someone perpetrates serious rights violations, then this 
gives the state grounds to remove public statues of that person. By ‘public statues’, 
I mean statues on display in, for example, public parks, public squares, shopping 
centres and public buildings.1 (I suggest that there may be an exception for statues on 
display in certain types of public museums or galleries, and that it can be permissible 
to move statues of wrongdoers to those public locations.) While I focus on statues, 
my arguments also apply to portraits and other depictions of historical fi gures that 
are on public display. Much of what I say also applies, perhaps with some adjustment, 
to other types of cultural property that do not depict historical fi gures but are in some 
way connected to them, such as buildings named after such fi gures.
I argue that a person’s being a serious rights violator is a suffi  cient condition 
for a state’s having a duty to remove a public statue of that person. Keeping public 
statues of serious rights violators is incompatible with the state’s duties to condemn 
and repudiate serious wrongdoing. We should recognise that a range of features can 
ground a duty to remove a public statue. There are, for example, lots of reasons to 
remove statues of Confederate soldiers: amongst other things, such statues cause 
distress, (Timmerman, forthcoming) give credence to white supremacist views, (See 
‘Take Em All Down’) and affi  rm existing social injustices (Moore, 2017).
The duty to remove a statue is a defeasible duty: like most duties, it can be de-
feated by lesser-evil considerations. Consider the following familiar example. I have 
promised to meet you for lunch, but pass a child drowning in a pond on my way to 
the restaurant. I can easily save the child, but not without missing our lunch date. 
While my promise to you confers on me a duty to meet you, that duty is defeated by 
my more stringent duty to save the child’s life. I thus justifi ably fail in my duty to meet 
you for lunch, given the harms at stake. This is not to say that my duty to meet you 
was not a genuine duty—I still seem to owe you an explanation for my absence, for 
example, and perhaps an apology. The claim is rather that it was all-things-consid-
ered permissible for me to fail to discharge my duty in this case. I take this to be the 
1.  I understand ‘public’ to here mean something that is either owned by the state, or receives (sub-
stantial) fi nancial state support. I do not address the issue of statues on private property.
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general structure of lesser-evil justifi cations for failing in one’s duties. Contrast this 
with a case in which I promise to meet you for lunch, but then realise that you have 
no intention of showing up (perhaps you mistakenly send me an email revealing that 
our lunch date is a cruel joke on your part). In this case, my duty to meet you seems 
to be negated rather than outweighed—that is, I simply cease to be under a duty to.
If removing a statue would, for example, spark a violent riot that would risk 
unjust harm to lots of people, the duty to remove could be outweighed by the duty 
not to foreseeably cause unjust harm. This would provide a lesser-evil justifi cation 
for keeping the statue. But it matters that the duty to remove is outweighed, rather 
than negated, by these consequences. Unlike when a duty is negated, one still owes 
something in cases of outweighing, as when I justifi ably fail to discharge my duty to 
meet you for lunch in order to save the child. As I will argue, it especially matters 
that the duty is outweighed by the predicted consequences of wrongful behaviour 
by others.
In Section Two, I defend the claim that public statues of persons typically express 
a positive evaluative attitude towards the subject. I defend this claim against the view 
that statues are primarily non-evaluative historical records and against the view that 
statues honour achievements rather than persons. In Section Three, I argue that a 
subject’s having engaged in serious rights violations gives us grounds to remove a 
public statue. In Section Four, I argue that states have duties to repudiate their own 
historical wrongdoing and to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. Both 
duties are, I argue, incompatible with retaining public statues of people who perpe-
trated serious rights violations. In Section Five, I argue that this also applies in the case 
of the ‘morally ambiguous’ wrongdoer, who both accomplishes signifi cant goods and 
perpetrates serious rights violations. In Section Six, I reject the view that we ought to 
remove statues of wrongdoers only when those statues cause harm. In Section Seven, 
I argue that the removal of statues is typically preferable to their recontextualization 
through explanatory plaques and the like. Section Eight concludes.
2. STATUES AS TYPICALLY EVALUATIVE
My account is partly motivated by the view that public statues of historical 
fi gures typically express positive evaluative attitudes towards that fi gure. We build and 
display public statues primarily as a means of honouring people, and such statues 
thus express a claim that the depicted fi gure is worthy of admiration or respect. Not 
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all statues do this: some statues are intended, for example, to mock or degrade the 
subject.2 My account does not support a duty to remove statues that critically depicts 
a wrongdoer performing a wrongful act, where the statue is clearly condemnatory. 
But the vast majority of statues of wrongdoers are not like this: they merely depict 
the person (often in a manner meant to convey their heroic or otherwise admirable 
status), and they are erected as expressions of esteem. Statues of historical fi gures are 
thus distinct from other types of commemorative monuments. A public statue com-
memorating a massacre, for example, need not express a positive evaluative attitude 
towards the massacre. But a public statue of a person who participated in a massacre 
is inappropriate precisely because such a statue would denote a positive evaluation 
of that person.3 As I will argue, it is because statues of historical fi gures are typically 
evaluative in this way that their being publicly displayed is typically incompatible 
with the duties to condemn and repudiate wrongdoing, and we thus have duties to 
remove them.
The positive evaluation view has two components: fi rst, that statues honour, and, 
second, that the object of this honouring is the depicted person. I defend each com-
ponent in turn.
2.1 Statues as honouring
The positive evaluation view can be contrasted with what I will call the histori-
cal record view, which holds that statues are merely or primarily historical records. 
According to this view, statues convey only importance or signifi cance, and have no 
connotations of admiration or respect (several commentators defend views that are 
variations on this theme, see Kuznar, 2017 and Beard, 2015).
If the historical record view were true, the dearth of public statues of, say, Hitler 
in Britain would be baffl  ing. It’s hard to imagine a more important historical fi gure 
in British history than Hitler. And yet the absence of such statues is far from baf-
fl ing. Rather, it is straightforwardly explained by the fact that we do not tend to build 
2.  Although not a statue, Marcus Harvey’s painting of Myra Hindley is a good example of a what 
we might call a ‘mere’ or even critical depiction of a historical fi gure, where there is clearly no expres-
sion of respect or admiration. The public reaction to Harvey’s painting demonstrates our (albeit 
rather selective) aversion to depicting wrongdoers.
3.  The statue of Josiah King, a Union soldier, in Minnesota is a case in point. King sits atop a 
statue honouring Union soldiers. But Native American activists have recently drawn attention to the 
fact that King also participated in a 1863 massacre of Native Americans. Since his role in the massacre 
has been publicised, there have been calls for the statue to be removed. See https://www.mprnews.
org/story/2018/09/27/iconic-minnesota-soldier-part-of-atrocity.
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statues to people whom we believe engaged in serious wrongdoing, even if those 
wrongs were of monumental historical signifi cance.4 The same goes for less signifi -
cant, but still widely-known, wrongdoers, such as the serial child killers Ian Brady 
and Myra Hindley. Brady and Hindley—the notorious ‘Moors Murderers’—are part 
of Britain’s collective national memory, but it would be incontrovertibly inappro-
priate to build statues of them. Importance is perhaps a necessary condition of our 
building a public statue of someone, but it is surely not suffi  cient. We build statues 
only to those people whom also we think it fi tting to admire.
This plausibly explains why, just as it has never seemed appropriate to build 
statues of Hitler, we would not now build a public statue to Cecil Rhodes. Colonialism 
was widely admired when Oriel College, Oxford erected its now-infamous statue of 
Rhodes in the early 1900s. Rhodes was lauded for his part in the violent theft of land 
from native black Africans for ‘civilising’ use by white Europeans. By contrast, we 
now regard Rhodes’ colonialism as part of a wider practice of serious rights viola-
tions. If statues are mere records, Rhodes’ wrongdoing gives us no reason not to build 
new public statues of him. And yet his wrongdoing seems to give us decisive reason 
not to build new statues to him.
The important point here is that when there is broad consensus about a per-
son’s wrongdoing, the question of building a statue of that person does not arise. 
Hence, the claim that statues have positive evaluative connotations seems sound. 
The problematic statues are built precisely because, at the time they are built, most 
people do not believe that the subject is a serious wrongdoer. But the fact that statues 
have these evaluative connotations supports not only refraining from building new 
statues of wrongdoers, but also taking existing statues of wrongdoers down. The fact 
that a statue already exists does not make it any less evaluative.5
While I argue that we ought to remove statues from most public spaces, I think 
we can make principled exceptions for some public museums and galleries.6 This 
is because museums, unlike parks or squares, are explicitly and primarily intended 
as places of historical record (see Sears, 2018). This has two relevant implications. 
4.  The ‘believe’ is important here: clearly, the claim is not that we do not build statues of wrong-
doers, but that we don’t build statues of people whom we believe, at the time, to be wrongdoers. 
More on this, including on wrongdoers who also achieve important goods, in Section Five.
5.  As I discuss in 2.1.2, it’s clearly the case that, at least sometimes, the removal of statues is con-
troversial because some people do not accept that the subject was a wrongdoer. However, this is not 
plausibly true of all those who argue that we ought to keep public statues of e.g. Rhodes. 
6.  I say ‘some’ because some museums and galleries are e.g. primarily propaganda tools, rather 
than places of historical record or aesthetic appreciation.
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First, it means that museum exhibits typically lack the evaluative dimension of other 
public displays. Museum exhibits are not typically restricted to things we admire—
rather, we use museums to display all kinds of objectionable things, such as medieval 
torture implements and relics from concentrations camps. The positioning of statues 
in prestigious locations, such as parks, town squares, town halls and so on is an im-
portant part of what makes public statues expressive of positive evaluative attitudes. 
The Mayor of New Orleans, Mitch Landrieu, emphasises the social signifi cance 
of putting Confederate soldiers “literally […] on a pedestal in our most prominent 
places of honour.” (Landrieu, 2017). When a community chooses to display a fi gure 
in a prominent, central location, where its members must regularly confront it, this 
choice expresses (or is at least reasonably interpreted as expressing) the communi-
ty’s view of what represents them.7 This is especially true given that such prominent 
places are, by their nature, limited in number, which means that there is inevitably a 
comparative dimension to the decision about who or what occupies them. Note too 
that the decision to continue to display a statue is not a historic decision, taken by 
now-dead inhabitants. Past generations may have decided to erect a statue; the deci-
sion to keep the statue—to continue to display it in the centre of the town square, or 
at the entrance to the public park or town hall—is made by the current generation.
Second, museum exhibits are usually accompanied by detailed explanations 
of their signifi cance, and displayed with other relevant artefacts that give a broad 
contextual setting. As Matthew A. Sears puts it, “[at] their best, museums convey 
history in all its messy complexity, and encourage visitors to ask questions of the 
past, including how it’s being used to shape the present. Monuments, on the other 
hand, are blunt-force objects, and frequently discourage nuance, deliberately distort-
ing the past to convey something in the present that may or may not be an outright 
falsehood.”(Sears, 2018). A statue of a slave-owner alongside examples of the tools 
used to punish and restrain slaves, for example, not only shows that respect or admi-
ration would be misplaced, but also genuinely informs the viewer about the historical 
wrongs of slavery, including the fact that slavery was once so widely accepted that 
people built public statues of slave-owners. Displaying a statue in a museum in this 
broader context does not express admiration for the depicted person. 
7.  This is, I think, compatible with some community members’ wanting to remove a statue, since 
the protesters object to being perceived to endorse these values, even if they do not endorse them. 
As C. Thi Nguyen argues, “[I]t is because monuments present themselves as expressing group com-
mitments that it matters so much to the group members that they get it right.” (Nguyen, 2019, 10)
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With respect to (at least some) art galleries, displaying a statue is expressive, but 
it’s usually expressive of an aesthetic evaluation of the statue qua sculpture, rather 
than of a positive evaluation of its subject. Since, again, the context makes this shift 
in expression clear, it could be permissible to display a statue of a wrongdoer in an 
art gallery. These considerations explain why it can be permissible to move a statue 
to a museum or gallery, even if, as I will argue, they ought not to be displayed in other 
public places.
2.1.2 Meaning as socially constructed
It might be objected that the expressive value of a statue is not settled by its cre-
ators or commissioners. For example, Lawrence A. Kuzner claims that, “these pieces 
of metal and stone have only the meaning we assign to them, and that meaning can 
take any form we like. They can be revered or reviled; honoured or ridiculed; or co-
opted for a new purpose.”(Kuznar, 2017). On this view, the fact that a statue was in-
tended as an expression of admiration by its creator or commissioner does not entail 
that it does, in fact, express admiration.
It’s true that the meaning of public statues is socially constructed. Such statues 
could have had a diff erent meaning, and we could, over time, shift our attitudes such 
that building public statues is no longer expressive of positive evaluative attitudes. 
It might also be true that the meaning of a statue is not settled by what its creators 
or commissioners intend (see Burch-Brown, 2017, for a related discussion of the pos-
sibility that statues can change their meaning). As I argued above, we can shift the 
expressive value of a statue by moving it to a museum or gallery. But, as the earlier 
discussion of building new statues of Rhodes shows, it’s nevertheless true—albeit 
contingently so—that public statues of people do typically express positive evalua-
tive attitudes, and that we regard only those worthy of admiration as fi tting subjects. 
Thus, the idea that we (whoever ‘we’ are) can simply make it the case that some par-
ticular public statue does not express a positive evaluative attitude towards its subject 
is unpersuasive. For as long as it is true that we build statues only to people whom 
we think worthy of respect, it is implausible that we can selectively withdraw this 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 HELEN FROWE8
connotation, or change the statue’s meaning simply by insisting that its meaning has 
changed.8
It is especially implausible that we might do this when there is no consensus 
about whether the subject merits respects. Given that some people believe that 
Rhodes statues rightly honour Rhodes, and that Confederate statues rightly honour 
confederate soldiers, it’s unclear how ‘we’ can make it the case that such statues no 
longer honour their subjects. The mere fact that the meaning of a type—in this case, 
public statues—is socially constructed does not entail that we (or some subset of ‘we’) 
can change the meaning of tokens of that type while leaving them in situ, and while 
there is no more general shift in our practices regarding public statues.
It is illuminating here to compare our attitudes to other honouring practices, 
such as the awarding of an honorary doctorate. Honorary doctorates recognise a per-
son’s outstanding contribution to a fi eld outside of the usual academic context. J.K. 
Rowling received an honorary doctorate from Edinburgh University for her contri-
butions to literature. Now imagine that we discover that Rowling did not write the 
Harry Potter books. We would not think that since the meaning of a doctorate is 
socially constructed, we can strip this particular doctorate of its honorifi c connota-
tions and thus allow Rowling to keep it. If you’re honoured in light of your putative 
achievements, but the relevant achievements turn out not to be yours, we withdraw 
the honour. We do not let you keep the award, but somehow strip it of its honour-
ing. We likewise strip athletes of medals when they cheat, rather strip their medals 
of their meaning. Similarly, if we build a statue of someone to honour them for their 
actions, but then realise that their actions are not, in fact, the kind of thing we ought 
to honour, we cannot simply insist that this particular statue no longer honours. Its 
meaning is determined by our wider practices, and cannot be selectively withdrawn.
2.1.3 Statues as historical records
It is even harder to sustain the idea that statues are primarily historical records 
once we recognise the selective nature of public monuments. Setting aside statues of 
royalty and fi ctional characters, only 3% of public statues in Britain depict women.
(BBC, 2018) The same is true in Australia (indeed, Australia has more statues of 
8.  I address the separate issue of recontextualization in Section 6. My argument here is directed 
at those who claim that since ‘we’ no longer approve of, for example, colonialism, the meaning of a 
Rhodes statue has thereby been changed.
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animals than of women (Spicer, 2017)). The United States does marginally better at 
10% (Peled, 2017). Prior to the erection of a statue of Mary Seacole 2016, there were 
no statues of historical black women in the UK at all. All the permanent statues in 
Trafalgar Square are of white men. As Madge Dresser argues, “[m]any Black Britons 
today, for example, feel personally excluded by the public commemorative conven-
tions of their country. If monuments are about remembering, who or what gets ‘for-
gotten’ in the public discourse can be just as signifi cant.” (Dressler, 2008; also Hirsch, 
2017). The idea that public statues are primarily historical records, and ought to be 
preserved as such, looks implausible in light of this selective approach to who we 
depict. Any account of history based on existing statues would be utterly inadequate 
and misrepresentative.
Of course, we might think that the appropriate response to these concerns is 
simply to build more statues. If the record is incomplete, we can correct this by build-
ing more statues of people from historically marginalised groups. But, again, if we 
care only about the record, we should also build public statues of Hitler, Stalin, and 
Brady. And, as I suggested above, the fact that we’re not prepared to do that suggests 
that statues are typically evaluative in the way I have claimed. This also explains the 
intuitive objection to attempting to ‘correct’ or complete the record by, say, putting a 
statue of Nelson Mandela alongside a statue of Rhodes. Rather than presenting a more 
rounded historical record, such a display would imply that Mandela and Rhodes are 
merely two sides of the same story—their actions on a moral par, their views equally 
reasonable, both worthy of respect. This implication is morally objectionable. Both 
are important historical fi gures about whom we need to educate ourselves. But only 
one merits the kind of positive evaluation expressed by a public statue.9
One objection to removing statues combines the claim that statues honour with 
the claim that they are historical records. According to this objection, the presence 
of the statues records the specifi c historical fact that these people were honoured. 
So, proponents of this view grant that statues honour, but think that it’s important 
to keep them as a record of that fact. For this argument to go through, then, we need 
to know why it is important to keep such a record. The most likely suggestion is that 
removing the statues will somehow lead us to repeat the mistakes of history. We need 
to remember that people used to honour colonialists and slave-traders, lest we forget 
9.  Note that Mandela’s participation in justifi ed violent actions in the struggle against Apartheid 
does not make him a serious rights violator, even if innocent people were thereby killed. Justifi ed 
transgressions infringe, rather than violate, rights.
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how widely such practices were accepted. But if what I have argued here is correct, 
keeping these statues up will not merely record that they were historically honoured, 
but also continue to honour their subjects. As I argue below, we have reason not to 
honour wrongdoers. And, as I argue in Section Six, we have a range of methods for 
remembering serious wrongdoing. It is not plausible that public statues of the perpe-
trators of serious wrongs are necessary for remembering either that serious wrong-
doing took place, or that some such wrongdoing was widely accepted. Given this, 
I doubt that the underlying claim—that keeping statues is necessary for avoiding 
future wrongdoing—is sound, and thus that it can defeat our reasons not to honour 
wrongdoers.
2.3 People or achievements?
We might doubt my claim that statues of historical fi gures honour people in 
light of their acts, arguing instead that statues express a positive evaluation only of 
some particular achievement, and express nothing about the depicted person more 
generally. Indeed, our explanation of why we have a statue of a person will typically 
be that he or she did something in particular—led the fi ght for votes for women, or 
defended Britain against the French, for example—rather than that he or she was an 
all-round good thing. Insofar as the celebrated achievement itself was not wrongful, 
nor tied to wrongdoing, perhaps we need not worry about whether the person also 
engaged in unrelated wrongdoing.
It is true that some honouring practices celebrate only specifi c achievements. 
Literary prizes, for example, honour a particular accomplishment rather than the 
person: they are awarded for a book, or a poem, or for a body of work. The same is 
true of scientifi c prizes or music awards.
Statues are not like this. Consider the myriad ways in which we can and do mark 
achievements, in addition to the kinds of awards just mentioned. We use, amongst 
other things, fountains, pillars, buildings, sculptures, bridges, parks, and trees. The 
fact that we choose to build a statue of a specifi c historical fi gure, rather than one of 
these other types of memorials, is not just the luck of the draw, then. It is meaningful—
that is, it is meant to express something about that person, rather than merely mark 
an achievement. There is a diff erence in kind between what is expressed by a fountain 
marking the abolition of slavery, such as the Buxton Memorial Fountain, and a statue 
of William Wilberforce. The Buxton fountain expresses an attitude about the aboli-
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tion of slavery. A statue of Wilberforce expresses an attitude about him, in light of his 
connection to abolition. This is further evidenced by the fact that we typically build 
statues of people after their death, and not immediately after their achievements.10 
It would be inappropriate, I think, to strip someone of a book prize because he or 
she was unveiled as a child abuser. Such prizes make no claims about the general 
admirability of the person (but see Archer and Matheson, 2019, for a defence of the 
view that honouring a person’s achievements encourages us to condone their wrong-
doing). But it would be appropriate to remove the author’s statue from the library 
in their home town on those grounds, precisely because statues express these more 
general evaluative attitudes. As Joanna Burch-Brown puts it, our assumption when 
we encounter statues is that “the fi gures involved are broadly positive and appropri-
ate sources of pride.”(Burch-Brown, 2017, 75).
3. SERIOUS RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
I contend that states ought to remove public statues of people who engaged in 
serious rights violations. I will assume that the category of serious rights violations 
includes violating the rights not to be killed, enslaved, raped, tortured and so on, as 
well as the violation of certain political rights, such as the right of self-determination 
that is plausibly violated by colonialism and unjust wars. I do not further defi ne the 
notion of a serious rights violation here. I focus on serious rights violations, which 
threaten individuals’ basic interests, because when one perpetrates a wrong of this 
sort, that fact becomes the dominant feature of one’s moral record, in a way that, say 
stealing a car or lying to one’s spouse does not. Serious rights violations are thus what 
we might call defi ning wrongs: they are always salient to our evaluation of the perpe-
trator, and typically negate their morally good deeds. Put bluntly, it does not matter 
how much money a person raises for charity if he also sexually abuses children.11 I 
leave it open here whether the perpetration of less serious wrongs (perhaps on a wide 
scale) can also ground a duty to remove a public statue.
10.   Thanks to Tom Douglas for this point.
11. I consider some issues surrounding reform and rehabilitation in Section 3.3
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3.1 Indirectly violating rights
I take it that the case for removing a public statue is clearest when the subject 
directly perpetrated serious rights violations herself—that is, when she killed or en-
slaved and so on. But it is implausible that only the direct perpetrators of wrongs 
violate rights: rather, those who indirectly participate in seriously wrongful practices 
can also thereby commit serious rights violations. Someone who owns no slaves, but 
runs a slave market, for example, is engaged in serious rights violations. The Mafi a 
boss who orders hits, but never kills anyone himself, is engaged in serious rights 
violations.
Of course, indirect participation in a practice such as slavery is widespread, es-
pecially when slavery is legal. Participants in the United States slave trade in the 18th 
and 19th centuries include not only slaveowners, catchers and traders, but also legisla-
tors who passed (or blocked) relevant legislation, individuals who knowingly bought 
goods produced by slaves, those who informed on escaped slaves and so on. It also 
includes Confederate soldiers who fought for the legal right to own slaves. There 
is often similarly broad indirect participation in an unjust war: vast swathes of the 
German population contributed to the Nazi campaign of aggression and genocide 
during the Second World War, for example.
As above, my account does not commit us to a moral sainthood standard for 
statues, where only those who live utterly morally pure lives are consider fi t for depic-
tion. My claim is only that we ought to remove statues depicting people who partici-
pated in serious rights violations of the sort described above. Nevertheless, given the 
scale of participation in many seriously wrongful practices, the implications of my 
thesis are revisionary, compelling states to remove many of their public statues. This 
is especially so given that it applies to statues honouring serious wrongdoers not only 
in light of their wrongful actions, but also in light of actions or achievements unre-
lated to wrongdoing. The implications of the thesis are broader still if one believes 
that (culpable) omissions can constitute serious rights violations.
Exactly how revisionary the thesis is, then, depends on the correct account of 
participation in a serious rights violation. For example, many people reject the claim 
that civilians engage in serious rights violations by knowingly contributing to unjust 
wars or genocides (see for example Haque, 2017, 57, 71; Fabre, 2009). They might also 
deny that those knowingly buying slave-produced goods violate the basic rights of 
slaves. They might propose a narrower account of what it is to violate basic rights. 
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Perhaps only those who directly perpetrate serious wrongs (e.g. Haque, 2017.; for re-
buttal see Frowe, 2019, 129), or whose contributions to those wrongs pass a certain 
causal threshold12, commit serious rights violations. Alternatively, we might draw 
upon existing accounts of accomplice liability to set the boundaries (the literature 
here is vast, but see, for example, Goodin and Lepora, 2013; Dressler, 2008, 429; Kutz, 
2007, 289—305; Bazargan-Forward, 2017).
My own view is that any plausible account of participating in serious rights vio-
lations is going to include lots of people who indirectly contribute to those viola-
tions, and thus generate the result that we should remove many—perhaps most—of 
our public statues of historical fi gures. Thankfully, though, we need not identify the 
correct account of participating in a serious rights violation here. Rather, the impor-
tant point for our purposes is that my account is revisionary only insofar as we grant 
that those who indirectly participate in serious wrongdoing do themselves commit 
serious rights violations. This is compatible with the view that not all participation in 
serious wrongdoing constitutes a serious rights violation (this idea is explored in lit-
erature on collective harms e.g. Kagan, 2011, 105-141; Nefsky, 2011, 364—395). But when 
participation in a wrongful practice does constitute a serious rights violation, it strikes 
me as very plausible that states ought to remove statues of those participants. The im-
plausible position would, I suggest, be to believe both that the participants engaged 
in serious rights violations and that it is nonetheless appropriate to depict them in 
public statues. As I argued above, such statues express a positive evaluative attitude 
towards the subject. As I’ll argue below, this means that such statues confl ict with the 
state’s duties to repudiate and condemn wrongdoing.13
4. GROUNDING THE DUTY TO REMOVE
I focus here on states—that is, state actors—as the bearer of the duty to remove 
statues. This is, in part, because I am considering public statues, the presence of 
which (at least ordinarily) falls under the authority of the state. Since it is the state, 
12.  E.g. Fabre, 2009, 43 -4; McMahan, 2009, 225. For dissent, see Frowe, 2014, 202-205. Of course, 
it is unclear how we should assess the signifi cance of causal contributions: several metaphysicians 
express scepticism about the idea that one can, for example, distinguish between contributions in 
terms of size. See e.g. Sartorio, in press; Tadros, 2018, 402-43. For a defence of degrees of causal sig-
nifi cance, see Kaiserman, 2016, 387-394.
13.  Burch-Brown also suggests that removing statues can be a means of condemning and repu-
diating wrongdoing, drawing on Seana Shiff rin’s work on reparations (Shiff rin, 2009). See Burch-
Brown, 2017, 69. 
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acting for its members, who decides what occupies our public spaces, it seems helpful 
to begin with the question of whether state actors have a duty to remove certain types 
of public statues. This is compatible with thinking that private individuals may also 
have certain duties with respect to statues of wrongdoers—to campaign for their 
removal, for example. But it is at least less obvious that private citizens have duties to 
remove public statues (not least because many will lack the ability to remove public 
statues).
My focus on states also refl ects the fact the state is sometimes uniquely or best 
situated to discharge certain duties, or express certain sentiments. There can, for 
example, be times when it is appropriate for a state representative to condemn wrong-
doing even if individual citizens need not do so (for example, see Cunningham, 2014). 
This is in part because, especially in the case of widespread serious wrongdoing, con-
demnation should be public, and expressive of the wider community’s rejection of 
the wrongdoing. Insofar as state actors speak for their citizens, their actions can have 
a signifi cance that individual actions lack. There is, in general, something especial-
ly powerful about offi  cial rejection or condemnation of wrongdoing. Consider, for 
example, the signifi cance (beyond the prospect of punishment) that victims of crimes 
attach to a perpetrator’s being found guilty of wrongdoing by a court. Even when 
the victim already knows that the perpetrator is guilty, the formal recognition by the 
state of this wrong is deeply meaningful.
4.1 The duty to repudiate
Plausibly, the state’s duty to remove statues is especially stringent in cases of 
state collusion in wrongdoing. The state can collude in wrongdoing in at least two 
ways. First, it can openly endorse the wrong by legalising it, as in the cases of slavery, 
the denial of women’s equal status, the forced adoption of Aboriginal children, and 
the persecution of homosexuals. Second, state actors might deliberately conceal 
wrongdoing by those in positions of authority and power, as with the sexual abuse of 
children in Catholic church, or the murder of black detainees in police custody.
There are at least three reasons why the duty to remove statues is plausibly most 
stringent when the state colluded in the relevant wrongdoing. First, such wrongs 
seem most likely to cause wider and more signifi cant harm: if a wrong is legal, for 
example, it may well be much more pervasive than if it attracts criminal sanctions. 
Second, a wrong’s being facilitated by a state or state actors has an expressive func-
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tion, since it conveys public sanctioning of the act, which seems to further wrong the 
victims (for discussion of how laws can constitute expressive harms, see, for example, 
Hill, 1999; Anderson and Pildes, 2000, 1503-1575; Blackburn, 1999, 467-491). It is one 
thing to be wronged; it is a further wrong to have one’s state fail to recognise that one 
is being mistreated. Whilst this most obviously applies in the case of legal wrongs, 
it plausibly also applies in other forms of state or state actors’ collusion in wrongdo-
ing. For example, it seems worse for state offi  cials to destroy or conceal evidence of 
wrongdoing compared to private individuals (and many states treat misconduct in a 
public offi  ce as an aggravating feature of wrongdoing). Third, having been implicated 
in these wrongs confers on the state a stringent duty to repudiate them now. It is this 
third feature that I explore here.
As I will understand it here, the duty to repudiate is distinct from the duties to 
condemn and punish wrongdoers, and prohibit or prevent wrongdoing. Repudiation 
is about rejecting one’s own past wrongdoing: it requires one to disavow certain at-
titudes and beliefs in virtue of one’s past behaviour. To see the appeal of this view of 
repudiation, consider the case of Muslims who are asked to publicly reject the wrongs 
of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists.14 I suggest that these requests are objectionable 
because, whilst they are often framed in the language of condemnation, they are, in 
eff ect, implicit demands that Muslims repudiate the wrongdoing of terrorists—that 
they disavow the beliefs underpinning such attacks. And yet repudiation is appropri-
ate only when one is somehow implicated in that wrongdoing.
Repudiation in the context of historic wrongdoing requires the state’s acknowl-
edging its past complicity in, or sanctioning of, wrongdoing, and explicitly rejecting 
the attitudes or values that underpinned that wrongdoing. For example, the British 
government’s responsibility for recognising injustices resulting from slavery, and re-
jecting the racism underlying slavery, is distinct from its usual responsibility to aid 
its citizens when they are the victims of other people’s wrongdoing. As the legal rep-
resentatives of the British state, the current government is responsible for recognis-
ing the harms of slavery in part because the state was partly responsible for those 
harms. Given its historical participation in slavery, the government must take steps to 
disavow slavery that it need not take with respect to wrongs in which it did not par-
ticipate. Repudiation requires, amongst other things, a public and sincere declaration 
14.  Ilhan Omar recently objected to being asked to issue a statement on female genital mutilation. 
See https://edition.cnn.com/videos/politics/2019/07/23/rep-ilhan-omar-calls-question-appalling-
muslim-conference-sot-vpx.cnn 
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of an act’s wrongfulness, and a commitment to not facilitate such wrongdoing in the 
future.15 And this, I suggest, is incompatible with publicly honouring the perpetra-
tors of the wrongdoing. Hence, the duty to repudiate confers on states an especially 
stringent duty to remove certain cultural artefacts.
We can helpfully draw here on the philosophical literature surrounding apology, 
particularly political apology. For example, Allison Don and Per-Erik Milam argue that 
an eff ective political apology must, “respond to blame by repudiating the misconduct, 
and profess a change in quality of will that shows the apologiser to be relevantly dif-
ferent from the off ender.” (Don and Milam, draft manuscript). This notion of reform 
is key to several accounts of apology: someone who apologises for her wrongdoing 
only to commit the same wrong again shows herself to be insincere in her apology, 
since the repetition suggests that she fails to properly recognize the wrongness of her 
conduct (see Bennett, draft manuscript; Matheson, draft manuscript).
Amongst individuals, showing the apologiser to be relevantly diff erent from the 
off ender requires a change in the off ender’s quality of will—we want her to change 
her attitudes or beliefs, in order to count her apology as sincere. But this does not 
work at the level of states: we are not looking for the apologiser to show that they 
are not the person they were, but rather to show that the state has reformed. This 
demands visible, publicly-accessible actions rejecting the past wrongs. And, as Don 
and Milam argue,
“[t]here is a genuine risk that a poorly executed political apology can deepen the 
divide between victim and off ender by demonstrating the opposite of what they in-
tend—e.g. that the state does not have due regard for the victimised group and is 
not suffi  ciently committed to avoiding similar misconduct in the future. However 
sincere its expression, the force of an apology can be undermined by doubts about 
attitudes of the collective and people on whose behalf it is being made. Victims may 
rightly feel that a spoken apology, unsupported by a concrete and signifi cant dem-
onstration of sincerity, does not do justice to the off ence, just as material repara-
tion without an acknowledgement of responsibility is also inadequate.” (Don and 
Milam, draft manuscript, 9).
I suggest that, in the absence of a lesser-evil justifi cation for keeping it, the 
15.  I do not address here what else repudiation involves (e.g. the disgorging of the benefi ts of 
injustice). 
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refusal to remove a public statue to someone who perpetrated the wrongs in ques-
tion undermines the idea that a state has reformed and genuinely repudiates its role 
in that wrongdoing. It thus gives victims legitimate grounds for believing that their 
complaints are not taken seriously by their state and co-citizens.
 4.2 The duty to condemn
Even when it lacks a duty to repudiate its own past wrongdoing, the state still 
has a duty to condemn other people’s serious wrongdoing. As I will argue, the duty to 
condemn is also incompatible with continuing to display statues of wrongdoers. Like 
the duty to repudiate, this duty is grounded in what is owed to the victims of wrong-
doing. As I argued above, those who are wronged with the help of their state, or state 
actors, are distinctively wronged, given the expressive function of state collusion. 
And the duty to remove statues is plausibly more stringent in collusion cases—that 
is, it might be less easily defeated by lesser-evil considerations—since we have partic-
ularly strong reason to recognise and make good harms for which we are responsible. 
Nevertheless, the duty to remove statues still obtains in the absence of state collusion 
in the relevant wrongdoing. It would be objectionable to remove a statue of someone 
who committed rights violations with the collusion of the state while leaving in place 
a statue of someone who committed similar wrongs without such collusion. States 
plausibly have duties to properly recognise and condemn wrongs done to their citi-
zens irrespective of whether they facilitated or concealed those wrongs.
There are straightforward instrumental reasons to condemn wrongdoing—for 
example, that so doing deters future wrongdoing. But there are also less instrumental 
reasons to condemn wrongdoing. Condemnation is primarily an expressive act. Its 
value does not rest solely on its capacity to deter future wrongdoing or prevent harm 
arising from past wrongdoing. It rather refl ects our intrinsic reasons to affi  rm victims’ 
moral standing in the face of actions that have denied that standing by publicly as-
serting the wrongfulness of those actions.
In this respect, the duty to condemn is like the duty to apologise: whilst apolo-
gies can have instrumental eff ects, smoothing social relations and so on, whether one 
has a duty to apologise does not seem to depend on whether apologising will, or is 
expected to, produce these eff ects. I can owe you an apology even if, or perhaps espe-
cially if, relations between us are irreparably damaged. The apology is owed in light 
of the wrong you have suff ered, not in light of the benefi cial eff ects of apologising. 
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Similarly, states’ duties to condemn wrongdoing are grounded in the reasons we have 
to publicly reject wrongdoers’ implicit or explicit claims about the moral status of 
their victims. Serious rights violations deny their victims’ equal moral standing; of-
fi cial, public condemnation of the wrong helps re-affi  rm that standing. Thus, unlike 
the duty to apologise (and the duty to repudiate), the duty to condemn obtains with 
respect to other people’s wrongs.
Importantly, there can be duties to condemn wrongdoing even if there is no 
duty to blame the perpetrator (although, of course, there will be cases in which 
both condemning and blaming is appropriate). Moral standing can be equally chal-
lenged by blameless and culpable wrongdoing. We can, for example, imagine that 
some American slaveowners genuinely believed that their slaves were inferior beings, 
and were better off  being enslaved rather than free. Perhaps slaveowners who held 
such beliefs were less culpable than slaveowners who were wholly indiff erent to their 
slaves’ wellbeing, or even non-culpable. It hardly follows that enslavement was less 
degrading for their slaves compared to the slaves of more culpable slaveowners. Thus, 
even if, for example, some slaveowners and Confederate soldiers were not blamewor-
thy for their actions, this does not show that we may display public statues of them. 
The duty to condemn is not grounded in the claim that the perpetrators deserve 
blame, but rather in the claim that the victims are owed appropriate recognition of 
the wrong (as argued by Burch-Brown, 2017, 77).
Expressions of condemnation are particularly important when there is no ques-
tion of punishing the perpetrator, as is usually the case with the subjects of public 
statues. Punishment serves multiple functions of condemning, blaming and penalis-
ing. When the perpetrator is dead, and escaped punishment during their lifetime, 
we have especially strong reason to independently condemn their wrongs, precisely 
because we cannot punish the perpetrator and express our condemnation of the 
wrong in that way.
The duty to condemn is owed most obviously to the victims of the particular 
wrong in question. Assuming that we can have duties to the dead, this includes 
victims who no longer exist. It also includes secondary victims—that is, those who 
suff er harm as a result of historical wrongs to others (such as the harms arising from 
the legacy of slavery that befall people who were not themselves enslaved). But it is 
also, I think, owed to citizens in general, both in their capacity as potential victims 
of other wrongs, and in light of their interest in living in a society in which each 
person’s moral standing is taken seriously by their state. We all have reason to want 
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our states to refrain from honouring wrongdoers. As I described in Section 2.1.1, our 
public monuments—and our decisions about whether to keep them—express a com-
munity’s values. I have a claim that my government remove public statues of people 
who engaged in serious wrongdoing, irrespective of whether I am a victim of such 
wrongdoing, since I have a legitimate interest in not being part of society that ex-
presses positive evaluative attitudes towards violent racists, slaveowners, misogynists 
and other wrongdoers; plausibly, I also have a responsibility to discourage the expres-
sion of such attitudes.
In order to count as discharging the duty to condemn, condemnation must 
be sincere. But one cannot sincerely condemn wrongdoing if one simultaneously 
honours the wrongdoer, as one does by retaining public statues of them. There’s an 
element here of the familiar idea that justice should not only be done, but also be seen 
to be done. As Adam Omar Hosein has recently argued, justice requires not only that 
states actually weight citizens’ interests equally, but also demonstrate that they do so, 
doing “a suffi  cient amount to secure for each member the confi dence that her rights 
and interests are being given equal weight.” (Hosein, 2018) Similarly, states need to 
give citizens the confi dence that they sincerely condemn wrongdoing. Denouncing 
slavery as a moral evil whilst keeping public statues of slaveowners, or of people who 
fought to sustain slavery, undermines a state’s claim to sincerity.
It seems to me that retaining public statues of wrongdoers is straightforwardly 
inconsistent with showing that one properly recognises the gravity of serious rights 
violations. This is true even if the state enacts other relevant measures, such as of-
fering compensation. But even if one denies that these things are straightforwardly 
inconsistent, it’s certainly plausible that one might reasonably interpret a refusal to 
remove a statue as indicative of a failure to properly grasp or attend to the wrongs 
in question, especially when those wrongs concern historically marginalised groups 
(see also Archer and Matheson, 2019).
4.3 Shifting norms
Refl ecting on the duties to repudiate and condemn gives us grounds for rejecting 
the shifting norms objection to removing controversial monuments. Roughly, this ob-
jection holds that someone who defended slavery or colonialism a century or so ago 
cannot be held to the moral standards that we endorse today, because those things 
Journal of Practical Ethics
 HELEN FROWE20
were legal and widely accepted back then. Thus, there is no duty to condemn such 
people. Hence, the duty to condemn cannot support a duty to remove public statues.
This argument is unpersuasive because, as above, there can be duties to condemn 
wrongdoing even if there is no duty to blame the perpetrator. The shifting norms 
objection seems particularly wrongheaded in the case of publicly-sanctioned or 
concealed wrongs. For example, the fact that social conditions in the United States 
might have made beliefs in the inferiority of enslaved people credible is partly what 
the state needs to publicly repudiate by removing the statue. It’s precisely because the 
state facilitated these wrongs by normalising them, by making them legal, or conceal-
ing them, or failing to punish them that the state now has a duty to repudiate those 
wrongs. That these excusing conditions existed cannot, therefore, be a reason for 
retaining public statues of wrongdoers.
5. ‘MORAL AMBIGUITY’
We might grant that there is a duty to remove statues of wrongdoers when the 
subject is honoured for their wrongdoing, or for achievements that were connected to 
that wrongdoing. Statues of Rhodes, for example, are particularly egregious because 
what is being commemorated—his role in the violent expansion of the British Empire 
(and, in the case of the statue at the University of Cape Town, ‘giving’ land to the 
university )—is the very thing that makes Rhodes morally objectionable. Similarly, 
statues of Confederate soldiers commemorate, specifi cally, their fi ght to retain the 
legal right to own slaves.16
More controversial is the claim that we should remove statues of people who 
perpetrated serious rights violations but also accomplished signifi cant moral goods. 
For example, some people think that we should keep statues of Thomas Jeff erson in 
light of his role as a Founding Father, even though Jeff erson was a slaveowner and a 
rapist (Danielle, 2017). The duty to remove is similarly controversial with respect to at 
least some people who used unjust means to achieve signifi cant goods. For example, 
Winston Churchill is largely credited with defeating Nazi aggression in Europe—
clearly, an enormously signifi cant moral good. But Churchill also authorised the use 
16.  It’s worth noting here that some statues of Confederate soldiers are not of specifi c individu-
als, but are instead generic statues depicting a type. Since these fi gures do not depict specifi c persons, 
but are rather intended to represent Confederate soldiers in general, they cannot be honouring ‘the 
person’ as a whole. However, here it’s very clear that what is honoured is the wrongful practice: hav-
ing these statues is akin to having a celebratory memorial of a massacre. Thus, there seems to be good 
reason to remove these statues as well as those depicting named individuals.
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of unjust means, such as the fi rebombing of Dresden, as part of this defeat. He is also 
alleged to have been responsible for serious wrongs elsewhere, such as the Bengal 
famine of 1943. Let us assume that Churchill was, in fact, so responsible, and that this 
famine violated the basic rights of the Bengalis who were thereby harmed, and that 
the bombing of Dresden violated the rights of at least some of the people who were 
thereby killed. Does it follow that we should not to have public statues of Churchill?
I think it does: it is wrong to honour those who engaged in serious wrongdoing, 
even if they also achieved signifi cant goods. It is objectionable not only to honour a 
person for her wrongdoing, but also despite her wrongdoing. To do so either ignores 
the fact that someone perpetrated serious rights violations, or implies that our duties 
to the victims of those violations are outweighed by some other consideration. The 
fi rst option seems like a straightforwardly disrespectful dismissal of the harms in-
fl icted on the victims of the wrongdoing, and of their claims to appropriate recog-
nition of those wrongs. The second is perhaps a better description of what people 
have in mind when they suggest that we ought to keep statues of Churchill even if 
they grant that he committed serious wrongs. But we must be careful not to mistake 
or misrepresent the considerations at stake. We are not weighing the duties to the 
victims against the importance of the good that the person achieved: it is not a ques-
tion of whether, for example, the duty to condemn the Bengali famine is trumped by 
the good of defeating the Nazis.
Rather, we are weighing the duty to condemn against the good of having the statue. 
And it’s very unclear what this good consists in, such that it could weigh against the 
claims of the victims of serious wrongdoing in this way. It seems very unlikely that 
anyone would suff er any setback of their important interests because of the absence 
of a statue of Churchill. Holding that erecting or keeping the statue is nonetheless 
more important than our duties to the victims thus seems to objectionably diminish 
their claims.
We might think that it’s important to honour people for achieving substantial 
moral goods: that we have a debt of gratitude to Churchill, for example, that trumps 
our duties to condemn and repudiate. But if this is true, it should hold across the 
board. There should, for example, be a genuine question about whether our gratitude 
for the millions that someone raises for charity outweighs our obligation to condemn 
their abuse of children, given that this money could plausibly save many lives, which 
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is a signifi cant moral good.17 Even if raising a couple of million doesn’t do the trick, 
there should be some point at which one raises enough money, or saves enough lives, 
that the resultant debt of gratitude outweighs the duty to condemn the abuse of chil-
dren, or other serious wrongs. I am sceptical that engaging in these trade-off s can 
support the permissibility of keeping or erecting statues of wrongdoers. Moreover, 
we need not deny that we owe gratitude to Churchill in order to satisfy our duties 
to condemn. We need only refrain from having public statues of Churchill. This is 
compatible with the permissibility of alternative expressions of gratitude that do not 
express the general admiration of the person in the way that statues do. A diff erent 
sort of memorial can celebrate Churchill’s winning of the war, just as the Buxton 
Fountain celebrates the abolition of legal slavery.
 I have suggested that serious rights violations dominate the perpetrator’s 
moral record, making public statues of them inappropriate. But what should we 
say about someone who engages in serious wrongdoing, but is later fully repentant, 
perhaps duly punished, and works hard to lead an admirable life of good deeds? Such 
cases raise philosophical questions concerning the persistence of personhood across 
time and changes of character that I cannot address here. But we should notice that 
reformed wrongdoers are importantly diff erent to the ‘morally ambiguous’ characters 
we are considering here. Reformed wrongdoers are those who undergo some change 
in their quality of will, ceasing their wrongful actions. Jeff erson’s wrongdoing, in con-
trast, was contemporaneous with his achievements; the slave-owning Jeff erson was 
the Founding Father Jeff erson. So too with Churchill.18 So, even if we think we may 
have public statues of those who renounce their wrongdoing and go on to achieve 
great things, this does not undermine the claim that we may not keep public statues 
of Jeff erson and Churchill.
17.  The Savile case is the obvious comparison here, although that case is complicated by the con-
nection between Savile’s abuse of children and his fundraising activities (that is, he used the position 
he obtained in a children’s hospital as a result of his charity work as a means to abuse the children). 
But I doubt that in an otherwise similar case in which the abuse was not enabled by the charitable 
works we would be any keener to engage in the kind of weighing described above.
18.  The converse can also occur, of course. Whatever we think about building statues of people 
who commit wrongs before reforming and achieving signifi cant goods will probably also settle the 
question of building statues to those who achieve goods and then ‘regress’ and commit wrongs. The 
Myanmar politician Aung San Suu Kyi is an example (for discussion of this case, see Matheson, 2019)
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6. HARM AS A CONSTRAINT ON REMOVAL
We might think that there can plausibly be a duty to remove statues of serious 
rights violators only if there currently exist, or will exist, people who are harmed by 
their wrongs, or if the statues themselves cause harm. That is, we might think that 
there is a harm constraint on a duty to remove statues. One possible attraction of such 
a constraint is that it seemingly limits the revisionary implications of my thesis. Most 
writers on this topic are keen to show that their view does not require taking down 
vast numbers of statues, particularly very old statues (see Timmerman, forthcom-
ing, 7; Burch-Brown, 2017, 78). For example, Johannes Schulz argues that Germans 
have no reason to feel degraded by Roman statues of Julius Caesar, despite Caesar’s 
brutal treatment of Germanic tribes, because the “hierarchy between the citizens and 
soldiers of the Roman Empire and the allegedly ‘barbaric’ tribes in Germania and 
Gaul no longer has any correspondence in the social reality of present-day Europe.” 
(Schulz, 2018, 5-6).
Thinking about genocide gives us good reason to reject a harm constraint on a 
duty to remove statues.19 Imagine a successful genocidal campaign that kills all the 
members of a certain group, but causes no harm to other people. Supporters of the 
genocidaires erect a statue in their honour, to which everyone else is indiff erent. If 
we have reason to remove statues only when there are current or future victims of 
the relevant wrongs, or when the statue causes harm, it would follow that there is 
no duty to remove a statue honouring the genocidaires. The same concern speaks 
against Schulz’s suggestion that we ought to remove statues that express degrading 
ideologies only when they are connected to existing wrongful social hierarchies. If 
one simply erases the members of the disadvantaged group, there is no persisting 
wrongful hierarchy. But the case for removal of honorifi c statues seems stronger, 
rather than eliminated, in such cases.
Thinking about Schulz’s example also suggests that a harm constraint might 
not, in fact, limit our obligations to remove statues. Much depends on how we identi-
fy the relevant degrading ideology. We might, like Schulz, describe Caesar’s ideology 
as the view that members of Germania and Gaul were inferior to Romans, and agree 
that since there is currently no wrongful social hierarchy between these groups—
perhaps the tribal groups don’t even exist anymore—there is no reason for Germans 
to feel degraded by statues of Caesar. But we might equally off er a broader reading of 
19. Thanks to Derek Matravers for suggesting this.
Journal of Practical Ethics
 HELEN FROWE24
Caesar’s ideology: he believed that not all humans enjoy equal moral standing, and 
that those of lesser standing may be murdered and enslaved. This ideology certainly 
corresponds to current social realities. Of course, on this broader reading, Germans 
have no special reason to feel degraded by statues of Caesar. But anyone who is cur-
rently harmed by a wrongful hierarchical system might legitimately object to, and feel 
degraded by, the commemorating of someone who perpetrated the belief that some 
types of people are inferior, and may be treated as such. It strikes me as wholly ap-
propriate for, say, an African-American to feel degraded by statues to racial suprema-
cists in general, rather than only by those who believed specifi cally in the inferiority 
of blacks. Moreover, it seems wholly appropriate for people in general to object to the 
presence of public statues of racial supremacists, irrespective of whether they them-
selves are harmed by the presence of racist hierarchies. The Germans might have no 
special complaint about the Caesar statues, but they may complain nonetheless.
7. WHY REMOVAL?
We might grant the force of the duties that I have articulated, but deny that they 
require us to remove statues from public display. Proponents of keeping statues of 
wrongdoers often claim that monuments can trigger conversations about the serious 
wrongs of the past, thereby presenting opportunities to educate ourselves about those 
wrongs (see also Beard, 2015; Schulz, 2018). If we remove the statues, the thought must 
go, we remove these valuable opportunities. Even though I have not ruled out the 
permissibility of keeping statues in museums, we might think that many people do 
not visit museums, and thus we would be denying valuable educational opportuni-
ties to, say, those from less privileged backgrounds.
Schulz argues that whether removing a controversial statue is appropriate 
depends on whether removal, rather than “various kinds of contextualisation”, is 
most likely to “further the establishment of relations of respect” between citizens 
(Schulz, 2018, 12). Schulz cites the decision not to rename the IG-Farben-Haus build-
ing at the University of Frankfurt as an example of a successful alternative to removal. 
Schulz describes how, “students and the administration agreed on contextualising 
the building, rather than renaming it. A large plaque […] now alludes to the involve-
ment of IG Farben in the Holocaust. A critical analysis of the company’s as well as the 
university’s actions during the Nazi period is part of campus walking tours.” (Ibid, 15). 
Schulz concedes that where a historical fi gure is “ambiguous”, in the sense described 
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above, greater contextualisation may be needed. For example, if the University of 
Virginia wants to keep its statues of Jeff erson, its students might be required to take 
classes, “on the history of slavery and Jeff erson’s relation to it”. (Ibid, 21).
But the use of these contextualising measures—plaques, critical commentaries, 
classes on slavery—does not require, and therefore cannot justify, keeping statues of 
serious rights violators or naming buildings after them. A re-named building can have 
a plaque noting that it used to be named after a company that participated in geno-
cide, thus sparking the same conversation about past injustices that Schulz describes. 
A campus tour can make the same observation. It can also point to where statues 
used to be, before they were removed or replaced. The historical fact of, for example, 
a building’s having been named after Holocaust collaborators is not rendered in-
accessible by renaming the building (see also Burch-Brown, 2017, 75; Timmerman, 
forthcoming, 5). The historical facts that justify compelling students to take classes 
on slavery persist even if we take down statues of Jeff erson.
Once we recognise that these ways of informing ourselves about past injustices 
are available even in the absence of these commemorations, it is unclear why keeping 
the commemoration but improving its context is preferable to removing it. It is an il-
lusion to think that statues, or a building’s having a particular name, provide valuable 
opportunities to educate ourselves about past wrongs. Since those opportunities are 
no less available in the absence of those commemorations, their provision by statues 
and the like is not valuable. Since the names and the statues play no essential role in 
facilitating the conversations that Schulz thinks can promote relations of respect, his 
argument does not support a permission to keep them.
This might seem at odds with the explanation in Section Two of why it could 
be permissible to display a statue of a wrongdoer in a museum, which points to the 
wider contextualisation that such venues provide. But recall that it’s not the mere 
contextualisation that renders such displays permissible—or rather, it’s not merely 
the lack of contextualisation that makes public displays impermissible. The location 
of public statues is also morally signifi cant: having a statue of a slaveowner on public 
display—particularly, for example, in the centre of your campus, or at the entrance to 
your library—is also expressive of a positive evaluative attitude towards that person. 
The comparative dimension is also signifi cant: to keep the statue of Jeff erson is to 
judge that having a contextualised statue of a slaveowner and rapist is better than 
having a statue of someone who did not perpetrate serious rights violations.
Of course, there is a range of recontextualization measures that one might 
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employ, in addition to the explanatory plaques and so on that Schulz has in mind. 
These include defacing public statues, as happened with the Rhodes statue at the 
University of Cape Town and many Confederate statues. Such actions can certainly 
express a rejection of the subject’s wrongdoing. But, crucially, they do not, ordinar-
ily, constitute a rejection of that wrongdoing by the state. Rather, they are usually 
unauthorised, illicit acts of vandalism carried out as acts of resistance to the state’s 
refusal to remove the statue. I think they are permissible, but this permissibility is 
partly explained by the fact that the state ought to remove the statues. In other words, 
whilst defacing public property is usually wrong, it might not be wrong when the 
state has failed in the duty that I have defended—namely, to remove the statue from 
public display.
Of course, the state could sanction such defacing as a means of repudiating and 
condemning the wrongdoing. But, fi rst, it is not clear to me why this is better than 
removing the statue (and, say, replacing it with a memorial to those who suff ered the 
harms of slavery or colonialism). And, second, it seems to me that state-sanctioned 
acts of vandalism typically lack the expressive power of illicit, rebellious defacement.
Alternatively, the state might install the ‘counterbalancing’ statues that I dis-
cussed in Section 2. These installations would be state actions, and so avoid the worry 
about non-state rejection of wrongdoing that arises in the case of vandalism. But I 
am sceptical that such counterbalancing is desirable, even if one could construct a 
display that avoided the ‘moral par’ objection that I raised with respect to Rhodes 
and Mandela. The deeper worry here is that, in many cases, the reason why recontex-
tualising a statue might seem preferable to removing it—might best foster relations 
of respect between citizens, as Schulz puts it—is that some people have objectionable 
attitudes that make them want to keep the statues of wrongdoers, and we predict 
that some of those people will act wrongly in the face of attempts to remove them.20 
This wrongdoing might manifest in, for example, violent resistance to attempts to 
remove the statue or, more insidiously, as heightened social tensions that exacerbate 
the wrongful attitudes that many people already hold.
The fact that some people will engage in wrongful behaviour in the face of at-
tempts at removal is, as I suggested in Section One, morally signifi cant. We should be 
sensitive to whether our actions will cause others to infl ict wrongful harms, and the 
20.  This is not to say, of course, that all those who oppose removal do so on the basis of objec-
tionable attitudes, or threaten violent opposition to their removal. But it seems plausible that many 
of those who are willing to resort to violent means in order to keep e.g. a Confederate statue are 
motivated by more than e.g. a concern about whitewashing the historical record. 
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threat of suffi  ciently grave wrongful harm can defeat the duty to remove a statue (for 
a discussion of our responsibility for harms imposed by others, see Frowe, 2014, ch.5). 
But such facts should not make their way into our deliberations about whether there 
is a duty to remove the statue, even if they bear on the all-things-considered permis-
sibility of removing it. Those who require the retaining of statues of wrongdoers as 
a condition of their not engaging in wrongful behaviour cannot thereby undermine 
the claims of the victims of serious rights violations.
By way of comparison, consider the British government’s policy of compensat-
ing slave owners for the ‘losses’ infl icted upon them by abolition. Compensating 
someone for taking away their slaves strikes us as objectionable, even if this policy 
best facilitates certain valuable ends, such as the end of slavery, because it constitutes 
a failure to properly recognise the wrong done to slaves. Indeed, it serves to legitimise 
slaveowners’ claims to own their slaves by legally reinforcing the notion of people 
as property. Given this, compensating the slaveowners was a pro tanto wrong, albeit 
one that was plausibly justifi ed as the lesser evil. Likewise, even if retaining statues is 
sometimes justifi ed on lesser-evil grounds, there is still an important sense in which 
keeping them is wrong. And, in both cases, the choice between evils is forced by 
wrongdoing.
There is thus a further wrong involved in cases in which a duty cannot be dis-
charged because of the predicted wrongdoing of others, compared to cases in which 
there is no such predicted wrongdoing. Compare a case in which removing a statue 
will unavoidably cause some toxic material to be released from its core with a case 
in which removing a statue will cause those who want to keep it to riot, thereby in-
fl icting harm on innocent people.21 In the riot case, there’s an important sense in the 
state’s failure to discharge its duty to remove the statue is unnecessary, since harm 
could also be avoided by everyone’s abiding by their moral obligations. This is not 
true of the toxic material case, in which harm can be avoided only by keeping the 
statue in place. The rioting case thus involves a wrong that is absent in the toxic ma-
terial case, since it is wrong for the prospective rioters to gratuitously render the state 
unable to discharge its duties. Note that this wrong does not arise only in the more 
extreme cases of rioting or other threats of physical harm. As I mentioned above, more 
subtle responses, such as holding increasingly hostile attitudes to members of certain 
groups, are also wrongful. This explains why, for example, African-Americans are 
entitled be aggrieved by the keeping of Confederate statues even if they grant that 
21. Thanks to an anonymous referee for this example.
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taking them down would overall worsen race relations in the United States, and that 
the statues should therefore stay. We should not have to keep statues of slaveowners 
or Confederate soldiers in order to have conditions for relations of respect, just as 
we shouldn’t have to compensate people in order to get them to give up their slaves.
8. CONCLUSIONS
I have argued that the state has a duty to condemn and repudiate serious wrong-
doing that is incompatible with retaining public statues of historical fi gures who per-
petrated serious rights violations. Public statues of such fi gures are typically evalua-
tive: they express a positive attitude about the depicted person that undermines the 
state’s claims to be sincerely condemning or repudiating their wrongdoing. I argued 
that the duty to remove public statues applies not only to statues honouring people 
for their wrongdoing, but also to statues that honour people despite their wrongdo-
ing. We cannot weigh morally signifi cant achievements against serious wrongdoing 
in order to justify public statues of wrongdoers. The duties to condemn and repu-
diate wrongdoing that underpin the duty to remove persist even when, in light of 
lesser-evil considerations, it is all-things-considered permissible to keep the statue. 
These lesser-evil considerations typically arise as a result of threatened wrongdoing; 
such threats of wrongdoing do not negate the state’s duties to condemn and repudi-
ate wrongdoing.
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